Evolution of the EU’s and Turkey’s Security Interests, Threat Perceptions and Discourse

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Abstract

The aim of this FEUTURE paper is threefold. First, it aims to present in outline the main dynamics that have characterized the security relations between Turkey and the EU since WWII, with a particular emphasis on the post-1999 period. Secondly, it identifies the main drivers that underpin the security manifestations of Turkey-EU relations. Thirdly, and on that footing, it presents the most likely of the three FEUTURE scenarios — conflict, cooperation, and convergence — in the field of security dynamics for the near future. In particular, the paper highlights both the centripetal and centrifugal forces that have marked and continue to mark the relationship. Also, global and regional dynamics and particularly the choices of the United States in the security sphere often drive the relationship even if domestic dynamics have seen a growing salience in the Post-Crisis period.

Özet

FEUTURE projesi bağlamında hazırlanan bu yazının üç temel amacı bulunmaktadır: birincisi, AB ile Türkiye arasındaki güvenlik ilişkilerinin temel dinamiklerini İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan itibaren, 1999’dan sonra gelişmelere ağırlık vererek ele almaktadır. İkincisi, bu ilişkilerdeki güvenlik boyutlarını öne çıkaran itici güçleri tanımlamaktadır. Üçüncüsü, güvenlik konusunda FEUTURE’un, çatışma, işbirliği ve uyumdan oluşan üç senaryosu içinde yakın gelecekte gerçekleşmesi en olası görüneni sunmaktadır. Yazı özellikle, bu ilişkilere damgasını vuran ve vurmaya devam edecek merkezevi ve merkezkaç güçleri tanımlamaktadır. Bu ilişkilerin evrilişinde özellikle kriz dönemi sonrasıda iç dinamikler öne çıkmış olsa da, küresel ve bölgesel gelişmelerin ve ABD’nin güvenlik alanındaki tercihlerinin etkisini de irdelemektedir.
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Introduction

“2017 promises to be, in terms of international relations, in terms of international foreign policy, in terms of international security, a year of maximum uncertainty (Ischinger, 2017)”. Those were the words of Wolfgang Ischinger, introducing the February 2017 Munich Security Conference. They are words that also well characterize the increasingly tested relationship between Turkey and the EU, not least as it pertains to security dynamics and threat perceptions. To Ischinger, this time of unpredictability reflects a lingering fear. The fear that the consensus orientation and institution-building type of international politics set in motion following WWII that created the liberal world order could come to be seen as an interregnum now giving way to a more illiberal future.

The question for this contribution to the FEUTURE research project is to determine what such a dire outlook will hold in store for relations between Turkey and the EU in the near future. In particular, the task is to figure out if issues that have to do with perceptions of fear and other security dynamics are likely to drive EU-Turkey relations in a more conflictual direction. Alternatively, to see whether they will, appearances to the contrary, drive Turkey and the EU in a more convergent direction. It is also possible that such dynamics, which contain countervailing elements will promise the outlook of a more or less uneasy cooperation between the two parties.

As this paper aims to spell out, the recent history of the EU-Turkey relationship pertaining to security dynamics have been marked by both centripetal and centrifugal forces. On the one hand, Turkey to the EU is one of only a few available regional partners for both external and internal security in a highly complex security environment. On the other hand, barring isolation from shifting alliances, Turkey might soon have to look to Europe again. Perhaps out of necessity rather than want, Turkey and the EU have found themselves dependent on each other for trade, for addressing the refugee crisis, and for keeping all out chaos at bay in the Levant. Also, they are still NATO partners.

On the other hand, Turkey hardly sees eye to eye with Europe on anything at present. The EU does not share Turkey’s threat perceptions, such as those stemming from the PKK and by possible proxy from the PYD/YPG in Syria. The same can be said about the alleged instigators of the coup attempt in July 2015, the Gülen movement. One can add to these from the European side Turkish leadership’s sweeping Nazi accusations against European governments, notably Germany and the Netherlands, during the constitutional referendum campaign of Spring 2017. To Europe, Turkey is about to submerge itself into an irreversibly illiberal future. Turkey is no longer a mere hurdle in Europe’s prioritized struggle against ISIL in Syria, or a rogue partner on EU dealings with Russia. The fear is that Turkey could — in a worst-case scenario — grow to become a security challenge in and of itself.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the ensuing section, we present in outline the key manifestations of the security related dynamics as they have developed since 1999, but also with a brief reach back to the beginnings of the Cold War in the Post-WWII context. Periodization is always contested, but we divide this historical period into three; each guided by global level dynamics.

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such as (i) the Cold War, (ii) the era of “Civilizations”, and the more recent time of (iii) unpredictability. Regional and national level dynamics cut across these global typologies. For Turkey, for example, the 1900s and 2000s are markedly different decades even if they both belong to the era of “Civilizations”.

In the section that follows, the paper presents an analysis and identification of the key drivers that have underpinned the security manifestations of the Turkey-EU relations, especially since 1999. Following that, an attempt is made to identify the drivers that are the most salient at the current juncture and which are the most likely to hold in the near future.

In the final section, the paper will outline the most likely of the three possible scenarios envisioned by the FEUTURE project — conflict, cooperation, or convergence — for the 2023 timeframe, bearing in mind the unpredictability that arguably characterizes the present.

**Historical Manifestations, Historical Periods of Turkey-EU Security Dynamics**

In 1999, the year NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary, Europe was once more after the carnage of Bosnia, the theatre of a war, this time by Serbia against its own province Kosovo. In that same year three Central European countries became members of the organization and plenty of new strategic initiatives were being taken to face the challenges of a new era or to find a mission for NATO whose reason for existence, the Soviet Union, had long disappeared. The phasing out of the Western European Union that kept Turkey fairly intimately linked to European security arrangements outside NATO had begun. CSDP, that would run into trouble in terms of its arrangements with NATO because of Turkey’s exclusion started to take shape.

This was also the year that the European Union corrected itself, partially because of American pressure and extended the status of candidate for membership to Turkey. This analysis will look into the security interest and threat perceptions of the EU and Turkey since then. The ups and downs in the security relations of the two parties reflect both reactions and adjustments to changing global conditions and the pressures and expediencies of their domestic politics.

In a variety of ways, the current period is a good one to start rethinking the future of the security dimension of EU-Turkey relations. It is also probably as inconvenient and inauspicious a time as any that can be found in the stormy relations between the two to even maintain a proper dialogue. The first statement speaks from a structural perspective that highlights the imperative of cooperation between the two parties to address the security challenges of a new era. The second statement reflects the decaying comity in these relations and the dramatic divergence of paths in commitment to a liberal order.

The historical record shows that EU-Turkey relations have been fairly “resilient” in face of mutual suspicions, divergent security interests and definition of security itself. They endured over decades
much hypocrisy, mutual double talk and mistrust, adverse developments and tumultuous conditions. One can reasonably expect, therefore, that the existing conjectural difficulties could be overcome if the two sides had the will to do so. As Matteo Colombo suggests,

“On the one hand, the EU lacks reliable local allies in dealing with current threats...(and) Ankara is potentially the best candidate for becoming the main regional partner of the European Union on these issues... On the other hand, Ankara could benefit from a closer partnership with the EU to help restore its image of a constructive actor and regain influence in the Middle East” (Colombo, 2016: 2).

Yet, the recent dramatic developments prior to the Dutch Parliamentary elections and the invectives that the principals in Turkey and the Netherlands threw at one another indicate how difficult it would be to maintain a balanced communication between members of the Union and Turkey. The mutual mistrust that poisons the relations are exacerbated by the rise of xenophobic and anti-Muslim sentiments in Europe and the strengthening of anti-Western sentiments and an Islamist identity in Turkey.

In the conceptual framework of this project then, the structural factors would nearly make cooperation an imperative but the existing domestic political developments and expediencies as well as ideational estrangement between the parties would either make a conflict scenario more plausible or impede cooperation. Convergence appears an increasingly distant if not impossible goal at least for the medium-term.

The Two Dimensions of Turkey’s “Westernness”

Although we think of the European integration project almost exclusively in terms of a functionalist economic model later fortified with adherence and commitment to liberal values and principles, in the background lurks a strong dimension of security. After all, it was clear that European integration that aimed to end war in the old Continent complemented the formal collective security presence of NATO in Europe. Turkey’s European and Western identities were mainly a function of its value for Western security and its location and role in the Western security system.

The end of the Cold War shook the certainty about Turkey’s Westernness in both its political and strategic senses. At the political level, Westernness meant Turkey had to fully adhere to the principles and institutional arrangements of the liberal model. The repeated and almost regular military interventions that were tolerated by other members of the “free world” would not be as easily accepted henceforth. At the security level, the informal end of the Cold War when the Berlin Wall fell, led some to question the value of Turkey in those terms as well. Such scruples were brushed aside in the wake of the twin crises of the 1990s; in the Balkans when Yugoslavia’s dissolution led to genocide and ethnic cleansing that presented a major security threat in Europe and in the Persian Gulf when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
During that decade, there was a constant tension between Turkey’s Western security identity and its Western political identity and that tension cast its shadow on its relations with the European Union. As Aybet and Müftüler-Baç (2000: 569) claim, 

“During the cold war, Turkey belonged to the Western security community. Thus, its identity as part of Europe in that period centred on the issue of security. In the post-cold war era, Turkey is still considered a component of the European Security Architecture. At the same time, its Europeanness is increasingly questioned”.

The Luxembourg Council decision in 1997 that denied Turkey candidacy for membership stemmed at least in part from a religiously based civilizational understanding of Europeanness, for which Turkey could only be the “other”. As we will try to show in the wake of the Kosovo crisis and the non-cooperative stance of the Turkish government with the EU that made the costs of Turkey’s exclusion clearer for all to see, that exclusionary approach was dropped. More consequentially, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, the value of Turkey as a strategic asset no longer stemmed solely from its location but from its domestic political ordering and the further institutionalization of its liberal democracy.

This is how, the then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (2004: 5) presented the reasoning behind the decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey:

“...a Turkey that is engaging in a process of renewal and meeting European standards is vital for the EU’s common foreign and security policy. If the modernization process in Turkey is successful, Turkey’s much-cited function as a bridge towards the Central Asian states and to the Middle East could become a reality. As a functioning democracy in a predominantly Muslim society, it could inspire neighbouring countries and thus increase the prospect of democratic reforms being implemented there. This would be the best response to the new challenges we are facing”.

**Parting Ways yet Needing Cooperation**

Alas, that moment when a broader definition of Europe prevailed in the halls of the European Council and Turkey’s rulers made what appeared to be genuine moves towards transforming Turkey’s “tutelary” democracy did not last long. The EU’s internal troubles became fully apparent with the calamitous Dutch and French referenda on the Constitution. Then, the Euro crisis followed by first, the refugee crisis and later by Brexit all together signalled an unravelling of the liberal order that stopped the process of enlargement as well. In Turkey, the consolidation of power by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the ideologically motivated strategic ambitions fanned by the transformative beginning of the Arab revolts paved the way for an increasingly authoritarian polity that was to gradually turn away from the EU project.

In the future, EU-Turkey relations will evolve in a global environment that is distinctly different from the one that prevailed during the Cold War and the early post-Cold War eras. Even if one
were to accept that a second Cold War era was launched when a newly assertive Russia took advantage of geopolitical opportunities, the nature of the competition is fundamentally different. The United States under the Trump administration is set to further dilute if not to dismantle the liberal world order in both its economic and strategic dimensions. The United States, in this vision, will no longer be the custodian of the liberal order and will not uphold the principle of free trade that defined the post-World War II American economic policy. A new era of economic protectionism/nationalism is in the offing.

Furthermore, President Trump’s deriding of NATO signals that the American commitment to the organization, despite the assurances that senior members of the administration gave to European audiences, could not be counted on. In fact, Trump’s attitude is a less gentle manifestation of a gradual loosening of ties that began under President Obama. The general direction of US policy appears to be towards some disengagement from Europe and parts of the Middle East. These may not be as dramatic as Trump’s campaign narrative suggested though. The apparent domination of foreign and security policies by the military wing of the Trump administration indicates more continuity than change, yet the aforementioned trends concerning Europe and the Middle East still remain in place. The Persian Gulf and East Asia will get more strategic attention and resources. This, along with President Trump’s obvious lack of commitment to liberal principles and dismissive attitude towards the European Union as a democratic project, suggest big cracks in the “West”, the security community that is meant to be based on shared values and was forged in the wake of WWII.

If indeed this is the direction the Trans-Atlantic Alliance is moving towards, and NATO’s future is less than certain, the EU will have to generate the resources for more autonomous defence capabilities and security structures. The shift from an almost exclusively soft-power based approach to security to one that is supported by higher and better hard power capabilities will have to accelerate. Given that NATO is the organization where EU members and Turkey have their security nexus, the weakening of the organization will bring forth the question of whether a particular Turkey-EU security framework and a set of operational mechanisms can be built.

One driver for the future EU-Turkey cooperation, under these circumstances, would be the changing American attitude vis-à-vis the Trans-Atlantic Alliance and the rise of shared challenges for the two partners. Increasingly, Europe will have to fend for itself and Turkey will have to rediscover the hazards of either playing the “lone wolf” or seeking an Eurasianist vocation with a less-than-accommodating Russia. Apart from cyber and energy security, the threats that the EU faces are a revanchist Russia, jihadist terrorists, environmental degradation, and civil wars in Africa and the Middle East that invariably spill over to Europe and exacerbate intercommunal tensions and provoke strife and terrorist activities. Last but not least, there is the fallout from Brexit (losing the second most important military member of the Union).

For Turkey, Russia’s assertiveness, at least for the moment, is not a major concern and Brexit is almost a welcome development since it opens up possibilities for a new framework of relations
with the EU. Refugees and particularly ISIS type jihadism are nowadays in Ankara’s threat list as well. In areas where the two could cooperate, such as the Balkans, the interests and policy preferences are too far apart and finding a common ground would necessitate an intense debate and healthy dialogue. But the biggest thorn in the relations is, Turkey’s Kurdish issue, or to put it more accurately, the divergent perceptions on the issue and its relation to the terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

This problem was treated in radically different ways in different times since 1999. At some point, a peaceful resolution appeared to be within reach. Today, Turkey is back to the approaches of the 1990s when its low intensity warfare against the PKK claimed thousands of lives and made a mockery of basic human rights and civil liberties. The main difference between now and the 1990s is of course the presence in Syria of potent Kurdish political and militia organizations, the PYD and the YPG respectively that are organically linked to the PKK and are making common cause in Syria against the Islamic State.

Whereas Turkey’s war against the PKK has been accepted as legitimate and did not draw much criticism lately from the EU, Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the PYD/YPG does not receive the same kind of understanding from any relevant party. As a result of this, and Ankara’s questionable management of the Kurdish dimension of the Syrian debacle, Turkey’s legitimate security concerns about the creation of a PYD run region across its southern border are not fully appreciated by its allies. On this issue, the EU and Turkey remain far apart and the position that the EU and its members take deepen Ankara’s mistrust. In the current political climate of the country, this feeds anti-European sentiments and makes a reasonable dialogue well-nigh impossible. This in turn brings back to the surface, the perennial questions about identity and belonging that always occupy a spot near the surface in EU-Turkey relations.

**Turkey’s Failing Quest for Autonomy**

The disastrous civil war in Syria has cost Turkey dearly in a variety of ways. Ankara’s policy arguably turned out to be a failure. In its dissatisfaction with American policies and lack of cooperation in fighting the PYD/YPG, Turkey even turned to Moscow after having alienated Russia when a Turkish Air Force fighter jet downed a Russian one. Turkey’s gambit to widen her strategic space by forging closer relations with Russia and respond to the siren call of an illusory Eurasianism appears to have failed as well.

Yet, the aspirations for autonomy, Eurasianism and even Ottomanism remain well and alive, mainly because the government wishes to use these instrumentally as bargaining chips in its relations with Western allies but also because ideologically it feels closer to these alternatives. To the extent that one can discern a pattern in its foreign and security policies, the government would prefer tightening its security links to the United States and ignore the EU while it tries to nurture its relations with Russia and the Gulf. Yet, at best the relations with Russia can evolve only in a condition of extreme inequality whereby Moscow nearly dictates the terms of the engagement.
and blocks Turkey’s aspirations wherever and however it sees fit. This strategic environment will ultimately leave Turkey with no better or more reasonable alternative than its existing ties to its Western partners.

Ankara’s own crass management of this seeming balancing game is at the end of its ropes anyway. When Turkey signed an agreement with Russia and Iran in Moscow on December 20, Ankara ostensibly recognized the legitimacy of the Assad regime and dropped its demand for its ouster as a pre-condition for ending the war. Later on, the Astana process that the three partners initiated also worked on this very premise. Therefore, Turkey’s favourable reaction when American Tomahawks missiles rained on al-Sha’eerat Airbase and its encouragement of further moves betrayed the letter and the spirit of the Moscow agreement. It is highly unlikely that Moscow would take this reaction and what it implies lightly. Given the Russian proclivity to take steps in Syria vis-à-vis PYD/YPG that go against Turkey’s declared concerns and interests, one can safely expect some kind of retaliation from Moscow.

If, as expected, the United States will have a lighter footprint in the Levant than before, problems such as the future of Syria, the containment of jihadi terrorism, control of migration and the mitigation of the refugee crisis will necessitate closer cooperation between Turkey and the European Union. A possible deterioration of relations in this changing security environment, hard security assets will be more relevant. As Brexit will clearly hurt the EU’s hard power capabilities, Turkey can be a good candidate to make up for the void left by the UK’s absence. Yet, cooperation between the parties cannot or should not be limited to the hard power dimension of security. The still possible synergy between the Union and Turkey must be activated despite the ill-will generated by the recent rows and the mutually disdainful language used by the principals. The reduction of the conflicts between the EU and Turkey to the matrix of religious or “civilizational” incompatibilities must be avoided at all costs. In the current political climate, both in Turkey and the EU this is a tall order but also the only reasonable way to avoid confrontation and make cooperation possible.

The Ups and Downs of Security Cooperation in the Post-Cold War or Civilizational Era

Security was what made Turkey’s participation in and inclusion to the West possible during the Cold War. The threat was clear and Turkey’s geography and the size of its military were its main assets. As Aybet and Müftüler-Baç (2000: 580) argue, “because Turkey’s association with the EU was a by-product of its inclusion in the ‘Western security community,’ when the Soviet threat disappeared, Turkey’s relations with the EU worsened”. Although Turkey’s membership in NATO still anchored it to the West and the United States continued to appreciate its strategic importance, divergence with Europe surfaced very clearly.

As during the Cold War, Turkey’s understanding of security remained a mostly military one in the post-Cold War period. As such, some members of the Union saw Turkey, whose self-perception
was one of security provider, as a security consumer that could bring the Middle East’s and perhaps the Caucusus’ problems into the EU. Turkey itself wanted to preserve the role of NATO in European security so as to continue to be part of the proposed European security architecture.

Turkey had conflicts with European powers that emanated from the way it conducted its war against the PKK. The infringement on human rights, restrictions on democratic freedoms brought about severe criticisms of Turkey in some European countries. This in turn exacerbated Turkish mistrust of European intentions. Yet, throughout this time Turkey also asserted itself as a security asset and began investing in a changed image as it contributed substantively in peace-keeping and peace-making operations under the UN, OSCE and NATO auspices. As a result, the Turkish military has built an impressive track record since the early 1990s as a reliable force for peace-keeping and peace-making around the world. Turkish military forces with air and naval elements have been involved in operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo and finally in Afghanistan where Turkey assumed the command of the ISAF more than once.

As Güvenç and Memişoğlu (2004: 226) note,

“Turkey has also assumed leading roles in various political, economic and military initiatives, promoting regional peace and stability. Among these initiatives, we could single out the South-eastern European Multinational Brigade (SEEBRIG) in the Balkans, and a Black Sea Naval Force on call (BLACKSEAFOR)”.

For the EU, the military dimension of security issues gradually took a back seat to the Union’s soft power although the desire to be responsible for Europe’s defence outside of NATO remained strong and led to a search for structure. At the end of the Cold War, the Union counted on its ability to affect change along its value system, political ideas, institutions and culture without resorting to violence in its neighbourhood. The policy of enlargement that was adopted after long debates did succeed in creating a ring of democratic regimes and stability that was provided by inclusion in the largest economic area in the world, and by the benefits accruing from the Union’s generous programs. Yet as Güvenç and Memişoğlu (2004: 218) point out, “that same soft power proved irrelevant in preventing ethnic conflicts turning into severe bloodshed in the Balkans”.

Partly as a result of this failure, the search for a European security architecture began in earnest. With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU initiated its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and tasked Western European Union (WEU) to “elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications” (Article J.7.3, 1992). Thus, the WEU would turn into the defence arm of the Union and strengthen the European pillar of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. Turkey became an associate member of the WEU in 1992 “with the right to fully participate in its Council meetings, its working groups, and subsidiary bodies, yet without voting rights in any of these” (Düzgit & Tocci, 2015: 119). With this arrangement, Turkey had enjoyed privileged access and participation in WEU activities. This quasi-harmonious relation was disrupted as the EU began to take steps to create its own autonomous defence policy and capability, a move initiated by France and
the UK at the Saint Malo summit in 1998. One result of this move would be the phasing out of WEU and Turkey’s growing unease about being left out of the European security architecture.

The Helsinki Summit that accorded to Turkey candidate status also declared that in the set-up of the CSDP:

“While non-EU NATO members could participate in an EU operation which uses NATO assets and capabilities, they had to be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations when NATO is not involved...In Turkey’s case, these decisions implied that although Turkey would have a voice in EU-led operations that used NATO assets and capabilities...it could be excluded from exclusive EU operations if one or more member states in the Council vetoed its participation” (in Düzgit & Tocci, 2015: 120).

The problems with this formulation were overcome finally when an agreement was reached as the Berlin Plus arrangements were accepted in March 2003. Turkey gained the right to be consulted if an operation that did not use NATO assets was to be conducted in its vicinity or affected its national interest and was reassured that CSDP would not be used against NATO allies under any circumstances. In the event, all these hard bargains and compromises amounted to little, as the accession of Cyprus to the EU blocked possibilities of cooperation as Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus vetoed in their respective organizations one another’s demarches.

Beyond the mechanics of the mainly futile search for a new European security architecture, the developments at the turn of the century are what actually brought the EU and Turkey together. The Kosovo bombing campaign of 1999 demonstrated that the EU needed to strengthen its military arm, if it were ever to play a serious role in Balkan security scenarios. Given Turkey’s contribution in that war and its military potential and existing capabilities, the Helsinki decision that came in the wake of the Kosovo war was probably not a coincidence. As Güvenç and Memişoğlu (2004: 219) note, “it seemed that Turkey had finally found itself the niche within the European integration process it has been seeking for years”.

**The 9/11 Transformation**

The attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda against the United States on September 11, 2001 were an obvious turning point in the post-Cold War era. The assumptions about the relatively benign nature of the “globalization” era were set aside as was the belief that the world was divided between “zones of danger” and “zones of safety”, and that the latter mainly consisting of the prosperous West was hermeneutically sealed from the former.

9/11 prompted a hard response from the United States and did not remain limited to punishing al-Qaeda and its host, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. As later accounts have shown, almost from the beginning, the Bush administration decided to use this terrorist incident to put in place a strategy of restructuring the Middle East. This would begin with a change of regime in Iraq. The main points of this strategy were articulated in President Bush’s historical speeches at West Point
(2002) and in the US Congress (CNN, 2002) and was codified in the National Security Strategy of 2002. In its National Security Strategy (2002), the United States accorded to itself the right to pre-emptively and preventively strike any adversary. It was determined to respond with overwhelming military force to any challenge and make sure that American military capabilities remained ahead of any potential adversary or group of adversaries. The fight against terrorism that was framed as a dichotomy of good versus evil singled out failed and rogue states as the most important threats and committed itself to nation-building and spread of democracy.

The Iraq War that emanated from the logic of this document divided European allies. In Turkey as well, there was resistance to unprecedented pressure on the part of the United States to be part of the coalition to attack Iraq. Some of the country’s principal foreign and security policy institutions and political actors opposed the permission to deploy American troops on Turkish soil to open a northern front. In the end the Turkish Parliament denied the permission requested by the Turkish government. In the EU, the controversy over the wisdom of the War and the American-British desire to bypass the UN, created serious divisions, dramatically manifested when 10 candidate members from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics wrote a letter of support for the war. The American Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld infamously declared the existence of an “old” and a “new” Europe.

Whatever the divisions, the challenge of an aggressive United States in pursuit of a hegemonic design in the world had to be met by the EU. This necessity was at the origin of the European Security Strategy that was published in 2003.

**European Security Strategy**

Security strategies are canvases where international actors project their vision of the world and the role they want to play therein. From an analytical point of view, strategies are aimed at responding to four key questions: what is the global environment faced by international actors, what threats and challenges unfold from this environment, what are their interests and priorities when confronting it and what foreign policy instruments are at the actor’s disposal (Biscop, 2015: 31). Strategies are thus a way to devise an “ends and means” approach to international politics, providing and promoting an international narrative *en passant*.

This operational approach is aimed at assessing the impact of an actor on the international scene, taking into account the strategic environment where it operates and the instruments and policies at its disposal. If an international actor is capable of putting forward a coherent strategy that responds to the four key questions above, its impact on the global stage is likely to produce the desired results and can thus be considered an effective strategic actor (Biscop & Colemont, 2012: 21). The international actor will thus have equipped itself with what Paul Kennedy defines as a grand strategy: “the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term best interests” (1991: 5).
Security strategies, however, also tell us a great deal about the self-assessment of international actors. These documents speak to an internal audience, with the aim of providing a normative framework for internal cohesion. In other words, strategies serve “identity-building aspirations” and become “autobiographies [which outline a] conception of self as a security actor of a particular kind” (Mälksoo, 2016: 3, 4). In the case of the EU, its security strategies enable the formation of a joint strategic culture (Cornish & Edwards, 2005), which takes as a point of departure the existence of 28 different national strategic cultures. The fact that these national strategic cultures have, throughout history, witnessed conflictual and confrontational episodes make the emergence of a joint European strategic culture particularly challenging (Meyer, 2005).

Despite the limitations in setting up a joint strategic culture, both the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 and the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) of 2016 can be considered as reflecting a shared “ends and means approach” to international politics and a self-assessment of the EU’s role in international security. The two following sections will review the reasons behind the publication of these two European security “autobiographies” as well as the self-perception that lies behind each strategic reflection. Both sections will also analyze the contents of the EU’s security strategies in terms of threat perception, security interests and the global environment where the EU found itself in 2003 and 2016.

**The European Security Strategy of 2003**

The then EU High Representative Javier Solana was entrusted with the drafting of the EU’s first security strategy in an informal meeting in Rhodes of General Affairs and External Relations Council (the so-called Gymnich meeting) during the Greek Presidency of the EU on 2nd and 3rd May 2003 (Bailes, 2005 & Larivé, 2014: 118). At that time, EU Member States were deeply concerned about the effects of the Global War on Terror and the division of Europe into what Donald Rumsfeld once called the “old” and the “new” Europe – i.e. the Europe that opposed the Iraq war and the one that supported the US-led invasion. In Rhodes, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs entrusted the High Representative – and the pen-holder of the ESS, the UK diplomat Robert Cooper – to write a joint document that would make emphasis on what united Europeans, not what divided them in terms of strategic thinking. Mirroring the United States’ National Security Strategy, the EU would for the first time put together a document to encode “an already existing way of thinking and practice” (Biava et al., 2011: 1235) in international security and that would signal the shape of the EU’s shared strategic culture in the eyes of others but, most importantly, that would also heal internal rifts.

Despite the divisive episode of the Iraq war, the EU was in good shape in several areas of activity. Back in 2003, European integration was showing its merits, with the Euro in the hands of over 300 million citizens and free movement in the Schengen area. The EU was showing the benefits of a unique experiment in world politics, where former enemies had surrendered basic features of national sovereignty to a “post-modern” entity (Cooper, 2003). Just at the time of the adoption of
the ESS in December 2003, the EU was discussing its most ambitious reform project in the form of a European Constitution, which although later rejected in the Netherlands and France’s referendums, signalled a large degree of self-confidence and Euro-optimism. The mood turned into enthusiasm when 10 countries, including seven from the former communist bloc, joined the EU in the largest single enlargement in 2004.

With the ESS, the EU projected Euro-enthusiasm towards the rest of the world. The document opens with its well-known “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (Council, 2003: 1) and despite portraying a gloomy picture in terms of global threats, it presents a confident vision of the capacity of the EU to shape world affairs in its own terms. The first chapter of the ESS is aimed at analyzing the global environment and the “global challenges and key threats” that affect the security of the Union” (Council, 2003: 2). Most of the challenges identified, relate to the effects of globalization, which the ESS considers an overall positive phenomenon but from which a series of security threats emanate. Globalization has blurred the distinction between internal and external security, so a new set of security threats such as extreme poverty, the spread of new diseases or economic failure reveal that “security has become a precondition for development” (Council, 2003: 2).

The ESS understands that, in addition to these global developments, some more concrete threats have a direct effect on the EU’s security. The ESS focused on five key threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. All of them reveal the strong connection between internal and external security in the era of globalization, and are markedly influenced by recent developments such as 9/11, the increased fear of international terrorists acquiring chemical or biological weapons, protracted conflicts in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond, cross-border trafficking and state failure as a source of instability and a potential multiplying effect of the rest of the identified threats.

Despite a demanding international environment in terms of threat proliferation, the ESS underlined the capacity of the EU to address them (Council, 2003: 6-10), provided that it becomes "more active in pursuing our strategic objectives" (Council 2003: 11), increased its capabilities in the field of security and defence, reinforced the coherence of its instruments and capabilities and succeeds in working with partners. The ESS identified three main strategic objectives to address the global environment and the threats previously underlined. First, the ESS focused on early action when addressing international threats. It highlights that “the first line of defense will often be abroad” (Council, 2003: 7), so conflict and threat prevention should become the Union's main priority. The ESS acknowledges that its security policies require a mixture of military, economic, humanitarian, intelligence and judiciary instruments, to name a few.

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1 It is worth noting that, despite the criticism of the ESS due to its insufficient clarity on how to match security needs with specific proposals, policies and instruments (see for instance Heisbourg 2004), the ESS opens the door to the set-up of the European Defence Agency and the European External Action Service (Council, 2003: 12).
Second, the ESS focused on building security and good governance in the EU’s neighbourhood. Setting the scene for the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the ESS underlined the need to establish a “ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (Council, 2003: 8). Specific attention is paid to the success of the enlargement policy in view of the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries in 2004, which the ESS understands to have contributed to the stability and modernization of these countries. However, the ESS also acknowledges that the enlargement policy cannot create "new dividing lines in Europe", which becomes a justification in itself for the set-up of the ENP.

Finally, the ESS put a strong emphasis on the notion of “effective multilateralism (Council, 2003: 9).” In clear opposition to the use of the US' use of "pre-emptive" military force in Iraq, the ESS bases the EU's action on the primacy of international law and the UN Charter. The success of the EU’s norm projection and its stance as a "normative power" (Manners 2002), leads the ESS to acknowledge the need to foster the role "international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security” (Council, 2003: 9). Effective multilateralism also encapsulates the need to foster regional organizations, which also signals the tendency of the EU to project its own successful experience in regional integration to the outer world.

**The Turkish Strategy**

There was no publicly available official document in this period explaining the framework of Turkey’s approach to foreign policy and the challenges the country faced. Yet, a number of theoretical statements, assertions and aspirations were available in the bulk of ambassador at large Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s work. An academic, whose book Strategic Depth, has become an unexpected best-seller was the point man for the new government’s foreign policy and managed to successfully market that policy with his colourful imagery and crowd pleasing aspirations.

The run-up to the Iraq War coincided with a momentous change of government in Turkey. The AKP with a pedigree in Turkey’s Islamist movement came to power in November of 2002 with an overwhelming majority and simultaneously had to deal with three major foreign and security policy issues: The Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, the European Council in December that would decide Turkey’s accession negotiations and the Iraq War.

The American response to 9/11 was mainly based on the overwhelming use of hard power. At the same time though, it sought to transform the politics of the Muslim world in a democratic direction. Therefore, a tendency that started during the Clinton administration to look at Turkey beyond its geographic location and military capabilities truly took root under the Bush administration. The goal was to make of Turkey the example of a democratic Muslim country that others in
the region would wish to emulate. The advent to power of a party that had Islamist roots in NATO member Turkey’s secular, democratic and economically rising setting was therefore very valuable.

The new Turkish government rose to the occasion by seriously pursuing EU accession, civilianizing the Turkish polity, implementing serious economic, political and administrative reforms. In its foreign policy, the AKP wanted to be pro-active and present Turkey as a shaper of its immediate environment. In its desire to de-securitize Turkish foreign policy approach that also served the goal of de-militarizing Turkish polity though, the AKP did not really have a well thought out security policy to complement its foreign policy framework. In the colourful imagery that Davutoğlu (later Foreign Minister and Prime Minister) used, Turkey has set out to pursue the following goals: 1) a new balance between freedom and security leading to de-securitization of many issues in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies, 2) to seek a relation of ‘zero problems’ with neighbours that would change the psychology of both Turkey’s foreign policy making and the response of its neighbours, 3) a multi-dimensional multi-channel foreign policy that suits Turkey’s self-designation as a “centre country”. This would render Turkey a problem-solving power rather than a problem generating one, 4) the shaping of a new diplomatic style that goes beyond the image of “Turkey as a bridge”. In this diplomatic style, not only would Turkey be a proactive player, it would also make use of the many dimensions of its identity, 5) and finally a transition to “rhythmic diplomacy” meaning a move away from a static understanding of diplomacy to a dynamic one and working to gain the capacity to respond in an agile fashion to rapidly changing circumstances (Davutoğlu, 2004).

As can be seen, Davutoğlu’s outlook was more concentrated on the geopolitics of the new environment than globalization that underpinned ESS. Yet, there were similarities in approaches and a visible preference for soft power that brought the two sides’ foreign policy decisions closer together. In fact, during the period of accelerated harmonization with the EU, Turkey’s foreign policy preferences closely tallied with those of the EU in UN votes. It was in this early period of AKP rule that Turkey took giant steps towards a resolution of the Cyprus conflict, managed to establish relations with all parties in the Iraqi political system and dramatically improved its relations with Syria. Ankara mediated the stalemate in Lebanon’s presidential election, brought Syria and Israel to the table in proximity talks, opened up trade and investment opportunities for its businesspeople in the region by lifting visa restrictions and promoting intensified trade and economic relations.

In 2005, after the assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Ankara refused to break its diplomatic ties with the Syrian regime. Although, it had good relations with Iran, it sought to use its influence in Syria and Iraq in particular to balance Tehran’s dominant presence. In a move that raised eyebrows but ultimately did not draw too much opposition, the AKP government invited the leader of the political bureau of Hamas, Khalid Meshal, to Turkey and refused to join the Western chorus that did not wish to recognize the organization’s victory at the polls in 2006.

In 2009-2010, Turkey wanted to play a bigger role in global politics by taking on the problem of Iran’s nuclear program. This ambition, reflective of the desire for a more autonomous role for
Ankara in global politics, was thwarted when the agreement with Tehran it brought about along with Brazil in May 2010 was rejected by the United States. Later, when Turkey voted against sanctions at the UNSC, despite a plea from President Obama to at least abstain, the reaction was swift and ultimately Ankara accepted the conclusions of the Lisbon summit of NATO, joined the missile shield program and even accepted the deployment of a radar on its soil that would be used for that program. Like in previous cases in different times, ultimately Turkey remained within the Western security parameters and did not allow its security Westernness to be questioned beyond a certain point. Then came the Arab revolts.

The Great Divergence

In retrospect and at least symbolically, the financial-economic crisis of 2008 and onwards seems to have opened the floodgates for the Western world. The full picture of relative economic regression, the rise of the rest led by China, the diminishing legitimacy of the West’s hegemonic position in the world’s political economy and strategic arrangements came to light. As the second decade of the 21st century unfolded, the West collectively faced several crises. The EU and its member states’ record in dealing with these was far from brilliant. In fact, as in the case of Libya, two European powers helped destroy a brutal regime without any precautions for its replacement and thereby exposed the Union to the onslaught of massive refugee waves from Africa and the humanitarian catastrophes that ensued, which made a mockery of Europe’s ethical principles, high-brow morality and values.

Ultimately, the EU failed to manage the Arab revolts and their aftermath and the members settled themselves to having cordial relations with Egypt’s brutal dictator General Sisi. Turkey, which supported the Muslim Brotherhood led government of Mohammed Morsi, was vehemently opposed to the coup and took a very harsh position against the General. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, the blatant efforts to disrupt the Union could not be met with the requisite resolve and solidarity even though the sanctions regime by and large held. Turkey took a conciliatory position on the Ukraine/Crimea issues despite the fact that the annexation of Crimea in particular would mean a reversal of the dominance of its navy in the Black Sea. On the refugee issue, the Union almost came apart as some members simply refuse to share this burden particularly at a time of rising xenophobia and right-wing populism. For Turkey that took in three million refugees from Syria, this issue or more correctly the EU’s handling of it, became a convenient cause for Europe-bashing that was useful for domestic political purposes.

The EU Global Strategy was penned under these circumstances and attempted to give a compass to the Union to face the security challenges of the 21st century when reliance on Washington for the provision of hard security could not be continued as before. The EUGS differed from its predecessor, reflecting the radically different political and security environment and the changing global balances.

The optimistic perception of the EU as capable of shaping the world in its own image and to address the threats derived from the contemporary order receives a more moderate assessment in
the EUGS. Affected by a series of internal and external challenges, the EUGS of 2016 reads as a "less complacent and more energized" (We Perfectly Know, 2016) strategy. Internally, at the time of working on a new strategy, the EU was still suffering from the long-lasting effects of the economic crisis, its incapacity to provide a durable and consistent response to the refugee crisis and the rise of populism, euro-scepticism and internal contestation, not only at the EU level but also in several member states. If that were not enough, the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, presented her Global Strategy the day after the UK voted to leave the EU in the Brexit referendum of 23rd of June.

Externally, the EU was confronted on the ongoing destabilising effects of terrorism, a disappointing "Arab Spring", including the civil war in Syria and the disintegration of the Libyan state, the consolidation of an authoritarian state in Egypt and the security threats emanating from the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. In the East, Russia adopted a defiant position vis-à-vis the EU and continued to threaten the European security order as a consequence of its actions in Crimea and Ukraine. In addition to the crisis in its neighbourhood, the EU was witnessing the consolidation of a more “connected, contested and complex” environment, as referred to in the strategic review presented by the HR/VP to prepare for the EUGS (EEAS, 2015).

Despite some voices arguing against the drafting of a new security strategy2, the EEAS and a proactive HR/VP - at least when compared to her predecessor, Catherine Ashton, who was not interested in strategic discussions - were in need of strategic guidance following the set-up of the Union’s External Action and the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Andersson et. al. 2011, Dijkstra 2016). However, taking the global, near and internal environment, it soon became clear that the EUGS would not kick off with the ESS’s eloquent and overly optimistic statement. The EUGS opens with a critical and modest self-assessment: "The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned" (EEAS, 2016: 3), but nonetheless aims at providing an overall strategy for the whole of the EU’s external action, geographically, thematically and instruments and policy-wise (Tocci, 2016).

The analysis of the global environment following the EEAS (2015) assessment, speaks of a series of "existential crises", both internal and external. However, the text avoids entering a careful diagnosis of the global environment, unlike its 2003 predecessor and the EEAS strategic review (EEAS, 2015), and it has been considered a more instrumental document, of limited ambition and policy-oriented (Barbé, 2016; Dijkstra, 2016; Tocci, 2016). The EUGS does not portray the Union as a force for good, but rather aims at adapting to an ever more complex global strategic environment by establishing the interests, principles and priorities of the EU and acting in a coherent manner.

The first interest of the EU is to “promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory” (EEAS, 2016: 14), taking into account the inextricable link between internal and external

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2 See for instance Menon (2012) and his argument that a new strategy would incentivize member states to shift attention from real insecurity problems and become a divisive exercise.

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security and the need to provide prosperity to Europeans and to the world. The adoption of a "principled pragmatism approach" reveals a less ambitious vision in promoting democracy and exporting the EU's model, given the self-image of the EU as a project affected by internal and external crises. The EUGS also sets the priorities of its external action. First, as a consequence of multiple external threats, the EU must ensure its own security and "strategic autonomy" (EEAS, 2016: 19), fostering "resilience" in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods and beyond (Wagner & Anholt, 2016; Biscop, 2017). The focus on its own security and resilience drives the EUGS away from the ESS's purpose to foster a "ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (Council, 2003: 8), again signalling a more cautious approach towards the international environment.

Second, the EUGS adopts an integrated approach to conflict that addresses the multiple dimensions of international crises in a coherent manner - thus taking into account the multiple policies of the EU beyond security and defence and integrating other external relations policies such as development, aid or trade, to name a few. Third, the EUGS acknowledges the limitations of exporting the EU's model of regional integration, conscious of the effects of long-lasting crises such as the economic, refugee and Brexit crises. It opts for promoting "cooperative regional orders" (EEAS, 2016: 32), thus adapting to Russia's threats to the European security order and instability in the southern neighbourhood. Finally, the EUGS also adopts a more pragmatic – and thus less normative – approach to multilateralism, substituting the ESS' "effective multilateralism" for a new framework of "global governance for the 21st century" (EEAS, 2016: 39). This approach should be accompanied by a revision of the institutions of global governance, given the new distribution of power at the international level.

The analysis of threat perception through the ESS and the EUGS reveals that EU strategies reflect both the view of the world and the image that the Union has vis-à-vis itself and its internal developments. International threats and security concerns are as present in EU strategies as the self-perception of its capacity to tackle them. So, while the Council adopted the ESS at a time of generalized euro-optimism, the EUGS was presented in the midst of "existential crises". These crises affect the discourse of the EU and the self-perceived ability to project power and influence in global affairs, making threat perception dependent on both the international environment and the internal shape of the EU. In a bit more than a decade, the EU reveals, through the contents of its security strategies, the current transformation of the international system and the retrenchment of the Union as a force for good.

The Phasing Out of Zero Problems

While the series of international crises caught the EU in a state of economic hardship and policy confusion, Turkey welcomed the dramatic regional developments. The social and political upheaval triggered by the self-emulation of Muhammed Bouazizi in Tunisia elevated Turkey’s status
again. In the wake of the aid ship Mavi Marmara debacle during which the Israeli military killed ten Turkish citizens, Turkey’s star appeared to be fading. Questions were being raised about a shift of axis on the part of Ankara, particularly when the row with Israel was compounded by the vote against sanctions on Iran. In that sense, the Arab revolts gave a new lease on life to the “Turkish model” of a secular, democratic, capitalist Muslim country that is a member of NATO and seeks membership in the EU. The mood in the Western world was one of “Turkish model to the rescue”. This was a role the AKP ideologues, with Davutoğlu taking the lead, have been waiting for a long time.

Turkey gave its full support to the democratic upheavals despite some hesitation at the beginning of the Libya conflict. The expectation was that Muslim Brotherhood’s different branches would come to power in those countries where a successful unseating of the government was achieved and elections were to be held. This was the moment of historical opportunity that the AKP ultimately failed to take advantage of. In fact, AKP’s mainly pragmatic, economic interest driven foreign policy was hijacked by ideological ambitions and passions that the Arab revolts stirred. Although in Tunisia things went both according to plan and proved sustainable, due in a major way to the wisdom of the head of the Islamist al-Nahda, Rachid Gannoushi, in Libya and Egypt things turned sour. Libya fell into the inferno of a civil war while in Egypt, a spectacularly unsuccessful Muslim Brotherhood government was overthrown by the military. Helpless in Libya, hopeful in Tunisia, the Turkish government was livid about the developments in Egypt. The severity of the reaction and the vilifying rhetoric against the coup makers helped bring diplomatic relations between the two countries to the brink of breaking.

The Syria Debacle and the Broken Dreams

It was in Syria though that the ideological and aspirational turn of Turkish foreign policy crashed. The Baathi regime proved to be more resilient than the Turkish government anticipated. The Iranian and Russian support for the regime never wavered and the West did not have a coherent strategy. In an act of generosity Turkey opened its borders to the Syrian refugees and one red line after another that determined the number of refugees who would be allowed in was erased. At the end of six years the country hosted nearly three million Syrians.

These refugees remained in Turkey until the summer of 2015 when the floodgates opened and they poured towards Europe. Many refugees left in often unsafe, lethally dangerous conditions. They tried to cross the Aegean Sea and get to Greece as the starting point of a longer journey to, preferably, prosperous Germany. The complicity of local authorities in this debacle is suspected. The EU that almost sleepwalked during the four years of the conflict suddenly faced a massive problem that exacerbated the perilous political conditions domestically everywhere.

In strategic terms, Turkey gambled on an early departure of Bashar al-Assad and supported different groups, allowed its borders to be used by jihadi militants who crossed to Syria to join the fight. Gradually it was sucked into the sectarian divide, and into a Mephistophelian deal with these jihadi
elements among the opposition. This put Turkey at odds with most of her allies, some of which deployed air defence systems at the border upon Turkey’s request to protect her from possible Syrian army retaliation. Turkey’s policy and effectiveness in Syria further deteriorated in November 2015 when Turkish Air Force downed a Russian plane, as a result of which Turkey’s operational capabilities within Syria were thwarted. Eight months later an apology was issued to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the relations started to heal.

Turkey was mainly silent when the Ukrainian crisis fully blossomed and did not take part in the sanctions regime. Despite the presence in the country of millions of people of Tatar descent Ankara did not unequivocally criticize the Russian move either. All of these developments also meant that the principle of “zero problems with neighbours” could no longer be sustained and in fact Ankara’s relations with virtually every neighbour soured as was the case with the United States as well. The two partners could not see eye to eye about the stature and the recognition that PYD/YPG, affiliates of the PKK, enjoyed as a successful fighting force against ISIS. Turkey’s persistent calls for the establishment of safe zones inside Syria and flight restriction zones fell on deaf ears, except in France, as well.

The American effort to convince the Turkish government that it was possible to peel the PYD away from the PKK did not resonate with the Turkish authorities and the fateful decision was taken to treat the two organizations as identical. This, in turn, virtually reduced all of Turkey’s Syria policy to denying the PYD there an autonomous zone of its own. In pursuit of this goal Turkey undertook Operation Euphrates Shield merely a month after the traumatic coup attempt of July 15, 2016. The operation lasted nearly seven months and Turkey took the city of al-Bab from the Islamic State. Yet, the urge to deny the PYD control over strategic spots like Manbij failed as the US and Russia separately prevented Turkey to move any further and limited its military presence to approximately 2000 square kilometres in northern Syria.

Both the USA and Russia protected the PYD and the Russian soldiers went so far as carrying PYD/YPG insignia on their uniforms. It is the debacles this fixation with PYD/YPG engendered that ultimately led Turkey to sign the Moscow agreement with Russia and Iran. By this agreement (Moscow Declaration, 2016) Ankara had to accept the legitimacy and durability of Bashar al-Assad whose ousting was previously a non-negotiable item on her agenda. It could not get, though, the opportunity to either move into Raqqa with the Americans or keep the Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces from becoming the allies of both the USA and Russia.

**Far from the Spirit of Copenhagen 2002**

As Turkey’s accession negotiations, that have long ceased to be taken seriously by observers, remain in a coma the language that defines Turkish-American relations have crept into EU-Turkey relations. The two sides cooperate on the basis of “trans-actionalism”. Undoubtedly, the most important of these transactional relations was the refugee deal that was signed in March of 2016. Whatever criticism one may lay on the agreement, and on ethical and international legality terms
there is plenty of that to go around, the deal worked (Özel & Öney, 2016). The flow of refugees stopped. Turkey though was denied the big prize of that agreement for its citizens, namely the right to travel visa free in the Union. The fallout from the failed coup attempt of July 15 was a tightening of the implementation of anti-terror law that Turkey refused to modify for the sake of the agreement. The suspension of many fundamental rights under the state of emergency as well as the extrajudicial measures taken by the authorities made it difficult to placate European publics. Most recently, the brouhaha with Germany and the Netherlands about campaigning by Turkish politicians in these countries further eroded trust and respect in interactions and left very little room for constructive engagement.

Looking forward, the security challenges for the two sides are abundant and despite the currently near-the breaking-point stature of relations, there are plenty of common security concerns. Syria is the most obvious case but there the Union and its members are mainly ineffective when it comes to determining the course of action. However, in the period for the reconstruction of the country and the rebuilding of its state, European countries and Turkey are likely to play an important role and must cooperate just as they did during the refugee crisis. This is the cooperation scenario that from a self-interest point of view is the most plausible alternative. Convergence is highly unlikely in the near future as is conflict. The two sides will have to think through the security implications of Brexit and work together to find a way of letting Turkey make up for the great loss in military terms that Brexit would imply.

The critical issue concerning Syria beyond the Kurdish one will be whether the EU and Turkey can find themselves on the same page in terms of the methods and means to fight violent Islamic radicalism. This issue for Turkey is beyond just a question of terrorism and is part of the search for the right combination of policies to balance Iranian and Shia influence to the south of the border. The Sunni Arabs of both Iraq and Syria have deeply ingrained and mostly legitimate grievances that are shared across the border by a segment of the Turkish population as well.

Russia is now Turkey’s neighbour both in the north and the south, a historically unprecedented condition. Russia is also making itself a neighbour of Europe in the south by its new moves in the war zones of Libya. In whichever direction the Trump administration ultimately decides to go vis-à-vis Russia, Europe and Turkey will have to find ways of dealing with Moscow’s policies particularly in places like the Balkans or near the Black Sea. Prior to his apology to President Putin, Turkey’s President Erdoğan complained that the Black Sea has virtually become a Russian lake (Kucera, 2016). Despite all appearances of cosiness between Moscow and Ankara, Russia did not entirely lift its economic sanctions against Turkey, visa requirement is in place, the PKK, that unlike the USA and the EU is not recognized as a terrorist organization by Russia, and the PYD have representative offices in Moscow. Russia is also a negative factor in Cyprus negotiations.

In the Black Sea, Turkey used to have the strongest navy and prided itself for having a condominium there with Russia. Since the Georgia War, Moscow’s reach in the Black Sea has widened and with the annexation of Crimea it has become the uncontested dominant power in the Black Sea.
This is a security concern of the first order for both the EU and Turkey as the “Russian navy is undergoing a process of radical modernization and will have 86 new vessels in the Black Sea by 2020” (Colombo, 2016: 5). As Colombo (2016: 6) notes, “it is important for both Ankara and the European Union to balance their military capability in the area as a deterrent for preventing conflicts in the future.” Just as Turkey was being forced to terminate its Operation Euphrates Shield under both Russian and American pressure, half its navy was conducting a joint naval exercise with Russia. Whether such ambivalence vis-à-vis Russia can continue as the Trump administration begins to pull its strategy together remains to be seen. If the Trans-Atlantic Alliance develops a common approach towards Russia that is more confrontational, Turkey’s ability to manoeuvre between its allies and its neighbour will diminish.

**Conclusion**

Given the existing domestic dynamics in both the European Union and Turkey, convergence is an unlikely prospect in relations. Whether cooperation or conflict will define the future in the long and resilient history between the two partners may well be a function of how rapidly the domestic crises in Europe and the identity contestation in Turkey are over. Throughout the campaign for the constitutional referendum, Turkey’s rulers forced the limits of anti-Westernism in the country. They picked up fights with member states, spoke liberally of bringing back the death penalty and even of putting the continuation of accession negotiations to a vote. Far more seriously the presence of the Turkish minority on European countries has been turned into a political weapon. Should that be the future direction of Turkey a conflictual relation at the political level should be expected.

Yet, as we suggested at the beginning of this paper, these relations also proved to be resilient. Structural conditions, existing institutional arrangements, necessity to act in concert on threats that cannot be met without cooperation still suggest and indeed force cooperation on security matters. These will be the drivers of future relations.

Turkey’s gambit with Russia is unlikely to go any further. That Ankara’s resources are insufficient for its hegemonic aspirations or its desire to be an autonomous actor have been laid bare in the course of the past six years. Turkey will need its alliance links in order to be able to pursue its security interests properly. A future of cooperative actions in security matters is, therefore, likely. However, particularly because of the Kurdish issue and the possible creation of an autonomous zone dominated by the PYD in Syria Turkey will feel threatened and will be tempted to act on its own. On the other hand, the expediency of sending the Syrian refugees back as well as the lure of participating in the costly rebuilding of Syria may provide a common ground to build upon.

Jihadi terrorism is now hurting Turkey as well. The likelihood of indigenous Salafi Jihadism growing as a threat is high. Therefore, on this issue as well as on cyber security and energy security there should be more ground for cooperation. On the matter of Iran, Turkey is going to be interested in
improved economic and trade relations but will be on the side of regional countries that are interested in containing and balancing Iran’s power and restraining its hegemonic aspirations. For the EU, Iran will mainly figure as an important economic opportunity and much less a security threat unless it revitalizes its nuclear program and reengages in terrorist activities in Europe itself.

To the extent that European provision of more of European security is to turn into reality, there will be many areas of cooperation between the parties so long as they can come up with an understanding of what their common interest lies for example in a region like the Balkans. Finally, if Brexit negotiations result in a new security arrangement and partnership between the UK and the European Union that could also serve as a model for Turkey just like Turkey’s customs union may provide a model for the future economic relations between the EU and the UK. The Turkish military, re-organized and re-structured can substitute for the British hard power, however, the temptation to act on its own will always be present in Turkey’s approach to security matters unless it is strongly imbedded in European institutional structures.
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ABOUT FEUTURE

FEUTURE sets out to explore fully different options for further EU-Turkey cooperation in the next decade, including analysis of the challenges and opportunities connected with further integration of Turkey with the EU.

To do so, FEUTURE applies a comprehensive research approach with the following three main objectives:

1. Mapping the dynamics of the EU-Turkey relationship in terms of their underlying historical narratives and thematic key drivers.
2. Testing and substantiating the most likely scenario(s) for the future and assessing the implications (challenges and opportunities) these may have on the EU and Turkey, as well as the neighbourhood and the global scene.
3. Drawing policy recommendations for the EU and Turkey on the basis of a strong evidence-based foundation in the future trajectory of EU-Turkey relations.

FEUTURE is coordinated by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels, Director of the Centre for Turkey and European Union Studies at the University of Cologne and Dr. Nathalie Tocci, Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.

The FEUTURE consortium consists of 15 renowned universities and think tanks from the EU, Turkey and the neighbourhood.

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